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Abstract
Drawing on upper echelons theory, this study examines how the traditionality of family chief executive officers
(CEOs) influences the selection of their successors, and how this relationship is moderated by two dimensions
of socioemotional wealth. Recognizing the central role of CEOs in determining successors, we show that a family
CEO’s cultural values regarding traditionality have a significant positive effect on the probability that a family member
is chosen as successor. We find that this relationship is strengthened by the family members’ identification with the
firm and weakened by the family members’ sense of dynasty. Our contributions to theory and practice are discussed.
Keywords
CEO traditionality, family members’ identification, sense of dynasty, successor choice

Introduction
In the family business literature on chief executive
officer (CEO) succession, an essential question is
whether the successor will be from within or outside the
family (K. S. Lee et al., 2003). Deciding the CEO’s origin is a critical strategic decision for every family firm
(Ansari et al., 2014; De Massis et al., 2008), as it sets the
tone for the firm’s foreseeable future. Previous family
business scholars have mainly investigated the antecedent of the insider succession decision through macrolevel analysis, such as sociocultural environment and
industry factors (e.g., Yan & Sorenson, 2006), firm-level
financial performance (e.g., Boeker & Goodstein, 1993),
and family-level noneconomic predictors (e.g., Jiang
et al., 2018). However, our understanding of microfoundations (e.g., CEO’s individual-level determinants) in
relation to intrafamily succession remains limited (De
Massis et al., 2016; De Massis & Foss, 2018). The
microfoundation perspective offers new insight into
how individual psychological attributes affect strategic
choice, a topic that has been neglected in family business research (Nicholson, 2008; Sharma et al., 2020).

Given the pivotal role of incumbents in the process of
successor selection (Gilding et al., 2015), family business scholars should investigate CEOs’ psychological
traits as predictors (De Massis & Foss, 2018; Kelleci
et al., 2019; Zahra & Newey, 2009).
Upper echelons theory suggests that executives
examine their decision circumstances through personalized lenses shaped by their past experiences, personalities, and values (Gupta et al., 2018). The idea that
executives’ psychological traits influence their selection
of strategic alternatives (e.g., successor choice) was formalized by this theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick &
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Mason, 1984). Several streams of research have shown
that the incumbent CEO’s psychological characteristics,
such as proactivity (Marler et al., 2017), optimism
(Campbell et al., 2011), and religion (Shen & Su, 2017),
play a significant role in successor selection. However,
few studies have explored the effect of family CEOs’ cultural values, specifically traditionality. As a key reflection of individual cultural values, traditionality has
garnered extensive academic attention (Farh et al., 1997;
Farh et al., 2007; Hui et al., 2004). Traditionality can be
understood as “the extent to which an individual endorses
the traditional hierarchical role relationships prescribed
by Confucian social ethics” (Farh et al., 2007, p. 717).
Although the literature on psychology and organizational behavior has revealed that traditionality affects
employee and middle manager decisions (e.g., Farh
et al., 2007; Hui et al., 2004), our understanding of how
CEOs’ traditionality shapes their attitudes toward inside
and outside successors in the family business context is
limited. It is important to address this research gap for
several reasons. First, research on cultural differences
has shown how family firms in the West versus those in
the East differ in their preferences for inside or outside
successors. In China, the preference is heavily influenced by Confucian ideology (Bennedsen et al., 2015).
Second, recent family business research has recognized
that at the individual level, CEOs have heterogeneous
personal cultural values that directly affect successor
selection (e.g., Dou & Li, 2013; Shen & Su, 2017).
Unlike Hofstede’s (2001) societal-level cultural values,
traditionality conceptualizes societal differences in
terms of individual subjective psychological characteristics. Thus, traditionality can serve as a new construct
to address the research gap between the family business
literature and the organizational behavior literature
(Marler et al., 2017). Third, the effects of a CEO’s traditionality are amplified in the family business context
due to the CEO’s ultimate authority over family governance (Nicholson, 2008). Family firms contend with the
paradoxical force between tradition and strategic change
(e.g., Erdogan et al., 2019). As such, it is worthwhile to
investigate how the CEO’s traditional values affect successor selection, which poses a potentially fundamental
change to the firm’s future (Ansari et al., 2014).
Another research gap in the family business literature
on succession is related to the heterogeneity of socioemotional wealth (SEW; Jiang et al., 2018) and the various family contexts caused by different levels of SEW
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accumulation. SEW is an important antecedent of
successor choice but is often considered a “black box”
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011), and few studies have considered its uniqueness in the family business context
(e.g., Schepers et al., 2014). Moreover, the microfoundations of SEW have been largely ignored (Daspit et al.,
2018; Holt et al., 2018). Compared with the numerous
studies on the direct effects of SEW, far fewer studies
have focused on the moderating role of SEW on executive traits and firm outcomes (e.g., Schepers et al., 2014).
For family firms, SEW is an intangible asset that can be
accumulated over time with firm growth (Shen & Su,
2017), which fosters unique decision situations for
CEOs. Thus, it is important to understand how incumbent CEOs’ psychological characteristics interact with
family contextual and affective variables such as SEW
(Klotz & Neubaum, 2016).
These research gaps raise two important questions.
First, does the traditionality of family incumbent CEOs
affect their choice of successor, and if so, how? Second,
how do different dimensions of SEW restrain or amplify
the effects of family CEOs’ traditionality on successor
choice? Answering these questions is crucial to the
family succession literature. Not only are incumbent
CEOs embedded in the national culture, but their social
relationships with other family members complicate
the decision-making process (Miller et al., 2020).
Relationships within a family system, including those
between family CEOs and their firms, are emotionally
charged and can thus complicate organizational interactions (Shepherd, 2016). We suggest that the combination
of a sociological perspective (e.g., different dimensions
of SEW) and an upper echelon perspective (e.g., CEO
traditionality) offers a useful theoretical framework for
studying family firm behaviors (Sharma et al., 2020).
Using upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason,
1984) and the concept of SEW (Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007), this study examines the relationship between
CEO traditionality and successor choice, and the moderating roles of different dimensions of SEW. Adopting
the construct of traditionality from psychology, this
study sheds light on the importance of family CEOs’
psychological traits in guiding their choice of successor.
We answer the call of Vandekerkhof et al. (2015) to consider emotional factors when exploring family firms’
decision to hire nonfamily managers. Grounded in the
SEW framework (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), this study
examines two family affective contingencies that affect
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the CEO traditionality–successor choice relationship:
(1) family members’ identification with the firm and (2)
family members’ sense of dynasty (Chua et al., 1999). In
examining the moderating effects of these two dimensions of SEW on the CEO’s traditionality, we aim to
capture the diversity of business-owning families in
terms of emotional capital (Daspit et al., 2018), and thus
contribute to the literature on the microfoundations of
SEW (Jiang et al., 2018), expand family business succession research on psychological foundations (De
Massis & Foss, 2018; Klotz & Neubaum, 2016), and
enrich the literature on the contingencies of upper echelons theory in the family business context (e.g., Lovelace
et al., 2018).

Theory and Hypotheses
Antecedents of Successor Choice in Family
Firms
The selection of a CEO successor is crucial to the success and continuity of a family business (K. S. Lee et al.,
2003; Zahra et al., 2004). The replacement of a CEO can
critically increase or diminish the power of managers
and employees and thus affect an organization’s future
direction, strategy, and structure (Peffer, 1981). Although
family firms might note that firms that transition to professional CEOs outperform those that maintain family
leadership (e.g., Chang & Shim, 2015), outsiders are
usually automatically handicapped in the process of
CEO succession (Agrawal et al., 2006). Unlike CEOs of
nonfamily firms, family CEOs generally prefer family
offspring or close family members to take over the business (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Stewart & Hitt, 2012;
Tabor et al., 2018). Strategy scholars have suggested
that outside successors are appointed only following
poor performance (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993) to introduce new ideas to the firm (Blumentritt et al., 2007).
When no qualified family successors are available, family firms face a dilemma in terms of CEO selection (e.g.,
Chang & Shim, 2015). Given the importance of the origin of the successor to a family firm’s prosperity and the
difficulty of making successor decisions, “there is a
need for a better understanding of what the important
factors are in choosing a family successor” (Keating &
Little, 1997, p. 159).
Scholars have explored a number of antecedents of
successor choice through macrolevel analysis (Ansari
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et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Shen & Su, 2017),
but the influence of the incumbent CEO’s psychological
decision-making process has been largely neglected in
family business research (De Massis & Foss, 2018;
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2007; Nicholson, 2008). There
has been little theorizing on how specific psychological
traits may offer insight in the family business context,
which is surprising given these traits’ usefulness in predicting behavioral outcomes (e.g., successor selection; De
Massis & Foss, 2018; Marler et al., 2017). Among the different CEO characteristics, psychologists have identified
the significant role of cultural values in constructing an
individual’s opinions on and attitudes toward family business succession decisions (Ruggieri et al., 2014). The literature on leadership has indicated that leaders’ belief and
value systems are culturally shared (House et al., 2004).
From a psychological perspective, we suggest that CEOs
with different cultural values may behave differently
when called upon to make strategic choices, such as
selecting successors (Hofstede, 2001).
Due to the long-standing scholarly interest in Chinese
family firms, the significant influence of Chinese culture on business and managerial practices has been well
documented (Ahlstrom et al., 2010; Su & Carney, 2013).
The literature on cultural differences has shown that predominantly U.S.-based models and constructs are inapplicable to Asian firms due to the differences in cultural
values between Asia and the West (e.g., Bruton et al.,
2003; Farh et al., 2007). The influence of cultural differences on a family firm’s preference to appoint outside
professional managers has also been well documented
(e.g., Burkart et al., 2003). Long and Chrisman (2014)
suggested that a combination of cultural norms and multilevel factors should be included in family business
research models to improve our understanding of the
succession process. Therefore, we argue that beyond
economic considerations, the cultural values of Chinese
CEOs provide an explanation for their preference for
inside successors.

Upper Echelons Theory and Incumbent
CEOs’ Traditionality
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has
long recognized that the observable characteristics of
top executives can help to explain how they make decisions. The theory posits that these characteristics are
proxies for the values and self-cognitions of executives
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(e.g., Christensen et al., 2015). As a CEO has a significant influence on strategic decisions, a firm’s propensity
to select a family successor is thus affected by the CEO’s
preferences and priorities, which are derived from their
personal values (Berson et al., 2008; Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner et al., 2013; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984).
Although the family business literature has shown
that incumbent CEOs’ personality traits affect their decisions regarding successor selection (Campbell et al.,
2011; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2015), the importance of
their cultural values has been neglected. A number of
empirical studies on executive characteristics have demonstrated the impact of top managers’ cultural backgrounds on corporate decisions and outcomes (e.g.,
Brochet et al., 2019; Du et al., 2017; Nguyen et al.,
2018). There is consistent evidence that CEOs’ cultural
characteristics are key motivators of firm behavior, with
incremental effects greater than the effects of other personal characteristics (Nguyen et al., 2017). Our study
focuses on CEO traditionality as the measure of the
executive’s individual-level cultural values (Fu &
Zhang, 2019; Minichilli et al., 2010).
Traditionality refers to the extent to which an individual endorses the traditional hierarchical role relationships as prescribed by Confucian social ethics (Farh
et al., 1997). Traditionality is distinct from Hofstede’s
(2001) cultural dimensions (e.g., power distance and
masculinity) in two ways. First, although Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions provide a great way to generalize
similarities and differences among countries in broad
strokes, they do not include the quintessential characteristics of Confucian societies. Traditionality is rooted in
Confucianism and reflects individuals’ moral obligation
to fulfill the normative expectations of social roles and
to advance collective benefits (Farh et al., 2007). Despite
both power distance and traditionality capturing the
degree of deference to authority figures, power distance
is a universal measure that carries fewer cultural and
moralistic overtones than traditionality (Farh et al.,
1997). Similarly, social norms characterized by masculinity emphasize material rewards and personal achievements, rather than people and quality of life (Hofstede,
2001). In contrast, traditionality is centered on Confucian
social ethics that endorse collective interests and family
relationships. Therefore, the definition and the operationalization of traditionality are distinct from those of
power distance and masculinity (Farh et al., 2007).
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Second, traditionality emphasizes individual differences
in people’s willingness and likelihood to behave in ways
that satisfy familial and societal expectations, whereas
Hofstede’s model emphasizes national cultural differences at the societal level. Extensive empirical evidence
has demonstrated the significant explanatory power of
traditionality on an individual’s diverse workplace
behaviors and outcomes (Farh et al., 1997; Spreitzer
et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2014). Given
the prevalence of traditionality in firms (Pillutla et al.,
2007) and the influences of both society and family in
shaping individual-level traditionality (Farh et al.,
2007), we argue that traditionality is one of the most
context-appropriate constructs to measure a CEO’s cultural value in the family business context.
For family firms in societies deeply influenced by
Confucian ideology, traditionality is regarded as a powerful predictor of incumbent CEO behaviors. In China,
people tend to accept social hierarchy and obey authority figures. Cultural characteristics related to the perceptions of hierarchical social relationships that are
consistent with Confucian ideology usually fall under
the umbrella concept of traditionality (e.g., Farh et al.,
2007). Moreover, traditionality is a representative and
universal phenomenon in Chinese organizations (Pillutla
et al., 2007). Over the past three decades, economic
reforms have transformed China from a centrally
planned economy to a market-driven economy, which
has led to fundamental changes in individual values
(Ahlstrom et al., 2007). Nevertheless, traditionality
remains pervasive in contemporary Chinese society
(Yang, 2003). Research on traditional Chinese values
has found that traditional values have a profound influence on management practices (Au & Kwan, 2009). In
today’s dynamic and increasingly internationalized
business environment, the juxtaposition of China’s market economy reforms and its deep-rooted traditional cultural values makes Chinese family firms the perfect
context for exploring this topic.

CEO Traditionality and Successor Choice
Traditionality is the degree to which individuals endorse
traditional Chinese values (Yang et al., 1989). The main
components of traditionality are respect for authority,
filial piety, ancestor worship, conservatism, endurance,
and male dominance (Farh et al., 2007). Individuals who
more strongly endorse such traditional values are more
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likely to apply them to personal relationships (Yang
et al., 1989). The traditional Chinese perception of the
head of the family as an authority figure and a parental
figure is readily generalized to the heads of larger social
groups or organizations. Regarded as father figures,
authority figures receive absolute loyalty and obedience
from both family members and organizational subordinates (Yang, 1993).
Traditional Chinese CEOs choose successors over
whom they maintain personal authority within a hierarchical relationship. Compared with outside professional
managers who have their own management knowledge
and authority, family member successors are more likely
to respect the incumbent’s ideas and obey the incumbent
as the organization’s parental authority. The goal of
keeping control and power of the firm within the family
makes family CEOs less willing than their nonfamily
counterparts to recruit the external human capital that is
typically needed for change (De Massis et al., 2019).
Choosing a family member as a successor is how traditional family CEOs protect their status as authority figures. The psychological basis of this choice is the belief
that family members (e.g., a son/daughter) will conform
to expectations and norms, and will display trust, protectiveness, and courtesy toward their father or father figure (Hui et al., 2004).
Furthermore, traditionalists are oriented toward
authoritarianism and the hierarchy of respect (Yang,
2003). Traditional family CEOs tend to embrace hierarchical role relationships in society. Interpersonal
relationships in Chinese Confucian society can be categorized into three relational hierarchies, from inside
(close) to outside (far): chia-jen (family members),
shou-jen (familiar people, such as relatives outside the
immediate family and family friends), and sheng-jen
(strangers; Yang, 1993). Thus, traditional family CEOs
are likely to treat family members very differently than
they do strangers. Traditional CEOs tend to more
strongly trust, relate to, and identify with family members than nonfamily members (Yang, 1993). More specifically, highly traditional CEOs treat family
members—connected by kinship ties, shared common
goals and values, and reciprocal trust (Aldrich & Cliff,
2003)—as their innermost circle in all areas of their
lives. In light of the above discussion, we posit that traditional family CEOs are likely to choose a family member as a successor to keep their authority figure status
because it is easier to exert personal influence over,
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share information with, and elicit trust and reciprocity
from family members than nonfamily members (Birtch
et al., 2018). Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the family CEOs’ traditionality, the more likely they choose family members as their successors.

The Moderating Role of SEW
Scholars have long acknowledged the significance of
environmental factors in constraining the effects of
CEO characteristics on firm decisions and outcomes
(Hambrick, 2007). Most of the literature that uses upper
echelons theory has focused on contextual factors, either
from a business perspective (e.g., Li & Tang, 2010) or
an institutional perspective (e.g., Nadkarni & Chen,
2014). The family-related emotional contexts of CEO
decision making have been largely ignored. James et al.
(2012) highlighted the importance of incorporating family-related contexts into family business research.
Following a nature versus nurture argument, family
plays a key role as the most significant contextual factor
affecting human development (Collins et al., 2000), as
family shapes the behavior of family CEOs. Through
repeated interactions with family members—that is, the
primary social group—individuals often modify their
behaviors based on feedback (Smith et al., 2009). In
family firms, the decisions of incumbent CEOs are often
driven by their family members’ affective characteristics
(Baron, 2008), which blur the boundaries between family and business (Berrone et al., 2010). A complex blend
of situational and relational factors inevitably influences
the attitudes of a family firm’s incumbent CEO toward
intrafamily succession (De Massis et al., 2016).
To fully understand the effect of incumbent CEOs’
traditionality on family firms’ successor choice, it is
necessary to incorporate the emotion-based factors
related to the owning families (Vandekerkhof et al.,
2015). We suggest that the concept of SEW (Berrone
et al., 2010), a key emotion-related factor relevant to
owning a family business, can aid our understanding of
the heterogeneous family contexts behind an incumbent’s successor choice. We further posit that the incumbent CEO’s attitudes toward the preference for inside
successors are influenced by their socioemotional contexts (De Massis et al., 2016). The literature has mainly
considered SEW as a singular direct antecedent of
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family firm behavior (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011),
and few studies have focused on its contingent effects
(Vandekerkhof et al., 2015). We argue that the extent to
which SEW varies among family firms provides a useful
heterogeneous family business context in which to
investigate the influence of CEO values on family firm
behavior. Thus, we explore the moderating effects of
two dimensions of SEW: family members’ identification
with the firm and family members’ sense of dynasty
(Berrone et al., 2012).
Family members’ identification with the firm refers
to the degree to which the members of the owning family perceive themselves as deeply intertwined with the
firm and are proud to be part of the family business
(Berrone et al., 2012). Research on social psychology
has shown that individuals who identify with particular
social groups (family firms in our case) are likely to
show favoritism toward members of these groups
(Turner et al., 1979). Family members who identify as
members of family firms make sense of their social
environment and define themselves in relation to the
incumbent CEO (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013).
When family members’ identification with the firm is
high, they are likely to respect the CEO’s traditional values and decisions in selecting an inside successor,
because they are cognizant of and value their group
membership, which thus translates into a deep emotional
investment in the firm (Ashforth et al., 2008; Deephouse
& Jaskiewicz, 2013). Given the incumbent CEO’s ultimate authority in the business, family members with
high identification with the firm are encouraged to help
realize the CEO’s goals, such as intrafamily succession
(Hekman et al., 2009; Liao et al., 2015). Furthermore,
family members’ strong identification with the firm fosters open communication, such that the incumbent CEO
and other family members can readily share opinions,
feedback, and expectations (Zellweger et al., 2010).
Family members who frequently interact and communicate with the incumbent CEO are likely to share their
views on successor choice (Sorenson et al., 2009) and
support their CEO’s decisions. Conversely, family members with low identification with the firm tend to be
indifferent to the succession decision. Family members
with low identification are less likely to devote personal
effort to helping an incumbent CEO with a high level of
traditionality to realize intrafamily succession.
More important, family members who have high
identification with the firm are more likely to pursue a
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career within the firm and be satisfied in their role as
successor (Dyck et al., 2002). These family members are
viewed as attractive succession candidates to incumbent
CEOs with high levels of traditionality seeking willing
and committed family successors (Barach & Ganitsky,
1995; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Sharma et al.,
2001). In contrast, family members who have low identification with the firm are more likely to develop careers
outside the family business, which shrinks the internal
talent pool of potential successors. Recent empirical evidence has shown that family members are less willing to
be successors when their commitment to the family is
low and the incumbent’s commitment to the family is
high, because such CEO–successor value incongruence
hinders the quality of their relationship (J. S. Lee et al.,
2019). Thus, traditional CEOs are less likely to believe
they can select the appropriate candidate from the existing pool of family members when the family’s identification with the firm is low. Taken together, we suggest
that family members’ sense of identification with the
firm magnifies the main effect of the CEO’s traditionality on the preference for a family successor. We hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: In family firms, family members’
identification with the firm positively moderates the
relationship between the family CEO’s traditionality
and the likelihood that an inside successor is chosen.
Family members’ sense of dynasty refers to the family’s intention to build an enterprise that will last for generations. This intention is often coupled with the family’s
strong desire to hand the business down to future generations (Berrone et al., 2012). The effectiveness of family
business succession is largely dependent on the family’s
desire for continuity and harmony (Gilding et al., 2015).
Thus, choosing a family successor is especially important because family ownership of the firm is essential to
the preservation and creation of the family’s SEW, and
having total control is the family’s only way to pursue its
personal interests through the business (Zellweger et al.,
2012). Zellweger et al. (2012) suggested that transgenerational sustainability is a central goal of family firms
and that families seek to ensure the renewal of family
bonds through dynastic succession.
For families with a strong sense of dynasty, the family business is not a mere asset that is easily sold because
it symbolizes the family’s traditions, values, heritage,
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and hopes for the future (Casson, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis,
1992). To maintain family traditions and values, family
members with a strong sense of dynasty are likely to
treat a family business as a long-term investment
(Berrone et al., 2010) and to support a traditional CEO’s
decision to select an inside successor. Different from
nonfamily CEOs, incumbent family CEOs seek successors who prioritize pursuing family values and goals
over business goals (Chrisman et al., 2013; Mahto et al.,
2010). When the owning family’s sense of dynasty is
high, the intrafamily succession goals of family members are more consistent with those of the traditional
CEO. As such, CEOs with high levels of traditionality
are more likely to find an inside successor who can meet
their requirement of pursuing family goals. When the
family’s values and goals are consistent with the incumbent CEO’s traditional values and goals, family members are more likely to support the CEO’s decisions,
which thus amplifies the effects of the CEO’s traditionality. Additionally, family members with a strong will to
maintain control of the firm over generations are more
committed to the family and the firm’s success
(Zellweger et al., 2011). This commitment encourages
more serious consideration over a qualified successor
and creates a larger talent pool of internal candidates
(Gersick et al., 1997). Thus, the positive effects of the
CEO’s traditionality on the inside successor decision are
strengthened with an increasing number of qualified
inside potential successors when the family’s sense of
dynasty is strong. Taken together, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 3: In family firms, family members’
sense of dynasty positively moderates the relationship between the family CEO’s traditionality and the
likelihood that an inside successor is chosen.

Method
Sample and Data Collection
We identified 580 family firms in eastern China through
an entrepreneurship research center at a large local university. China is a suitable setting to conduct research on
CEO traditionality because Chinese people are often
strongly influenced by their relationships with relevant
others in a hierarchical social system (Tsui & Farh,
1997). We identified family firms by tracking elements
that capture the nature and extent of family involvement
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in business operations (Lansberg & Astrachan, 1994;
Miller et al., 2008). We used family ownership and the
number of family members in the top management team
to measure family involvement. If a business had family
ownership and employed at least two family members as
top managers, we considered it a family business.
Our questionnaires were delivered in person or
mailed to the CEOs of the 580 targeted family businesses through contact information provided by students
enrolled in the focal university’s entrepreneurship
classes. We informed all the respondents of the academic purpose of the project in advance and assured
them that their responses would remain confidential and
that only aggregate findings would be reported. We
received 239 responses, a response rate of 41.2%. We
excluded 29 incomplete questionnaires and 14 questionnaires with inconsistent answers, which reduced the
sample to 196 family firms. Most of the CEOs who participated in the survey were men (88%), and most were
middle-aged (83% were between 40 and 60 years old).

Measures
Following the translation–back-translation procedure
(Brislin, 1986), we converted the relevant English items
into Chinese for our survey. Unless otherwise indicated,
all our items were measured on 7-point Likert-type
scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
CEO Traditionality. We measured CEO traditionality
using the five-item short-form scale proposed by Farh
et al. (2007). This shortened scale has been used successfully in previous organizational behavior research in
Asian contexts (e.g., Chen & Aryee, 2007; Farh et al.,
2007; Hui et al., 2004). The five items of the scale are as
follows: (1) “The chief government official is like the
head of a household. The citizen should obey his decisions on all matters.” (2) “The best way to avoid mistakes is to follow the instructions of senior persons.” (3)
“Before marriage, a woman should subordinate herself
to her father; after marriage, to her husband.” (4) “Children should respect those people who are respected by
their parents.” (5) “When people are in dispute, they
should ask the most senior person to decide who is
right.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is .89, indicating
a high level of reliability.
Successor Choice. We used two questions to measure the
likelihood that a family firm selects an insider successor.
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First, we asked the respondents the following question:
“Have you selected your potential successor?” with the
options “yes” or “no.” If the respondents answered
“yes,” they were required to answer the second question:
“Who is selected as your potential successor?” with the
four options “children,” “other family members,” “outside professional managers,” and “other (please specify).” The variable was coded as 1 if the family CEO
chose children or another family member as the potential successor, and 0 otherwise.
Family Members’ Identification With the Firm. We measured family members’ identification with the firm using
a six-item scale based on Berrone et al. (2012). Sample
items are as follows: “Family members have a strong
sense of belonging to our family business”; “Family
members feel that our family business’s success is their
own success”; “Our family business has a great deal of
personal meaning for family members.” Cronbach’s
alpha for this scale is .92, indicating high reliability.
Family Members’ Sense of Dynasty. We measured family
members’ sense of dynasty using a four-item scale suggested by Berrone et al. (2012). Sample items are as follows: “Continuing the family legacy and tradition is an
important goal for my family business”; “Family owners
are less likely to evaluate their investment on a shortterm basis”; “Family members are unlikely to consider
selling the family business”; “Successful business transfer to the next generation is an important goal for family
members.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is .85, indicating high reliability.
Validity Test. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using the Amos 17.0 software package (Joreskog &
Sorbom, 2004). The results indicated a poor fit for the
one-factor model (chi-square [χ2] = 941.6; degrees of
freedom [df] = 90; comparative fit index [CFI] = 0.52;
Tucker–Lewis index[TLI] = 0.43; incremental fit index
[IFI] = 0.52; root mean square residual [RMR] = 0.26),
and an acceptable fit for our hypothesized three-factor
model of traditionality, sense of dynasty, and identification with the firm (χ2 = 262.85, df = 87, CFI = 0.90,
TLI = 0.89, IFI = 0.91, RMR = 0.076). The scale items
loaded strongly on each hypothesized factor: traditionality (scale items: 0.72-0.83), the family’s identification
with the firm (scale items: 0.71-0.87), and the family’s
sense of dynasty (scale items: 0.70-0.85). We also evaluated discriminant validity by using the χ2 difference test
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(Chang & King, 2005) and examining the factor correlations. The correlations between any two factors were
lower than 0.5, indicating the discriminant validity of the
three constructs (Bhattacherjee, 2002). These results
demonstrated the convergent and discriminant validity of
the three construct measures in our model.
Control Variables. We controlled for the effects of firm,
family, industry, and CEO individual-level characteristics on successor choice. First, we controlled for the
firm’s age, size, and past performance because these
variables have been found to be directly associated with
successor choice (McColgan & Hillier, 2009). Firm age
was measured as the logarithm of the number of years
since the firm was founded. Firm size was measured as
the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Second, we controlled for the effects of family ownership and family
involvement on successor choice (Ansari et al., 2014).
Family ownership was measured as the percentage of
shares owned by the family. Family involvement was
measured as the number of family members in top management positions. In the survey, we asked the respondents to answer the following question: “How many
family members work as top managers in your company?” Third, we controlled for the CEO’s age, gender,
education level, birth order, number of siblings (Keating
& Little, 1997; Rogers & Salamon, 1983), expected
retirement age, and religious beliefs. We controlled for
religion because the incumbent CEO’s religiosity has
been shown to play an important governance role, which
may affect succession decisions (Shen & Su, 2017). We
also controlled for the effects of the CEO’s number of
siblings and number of children to rule out the influence
of family human capital on successor choice (e.g.,
Parker, 2016). Finally, we controlled for industry differences by including industry dummy variables.

Data Analysis
To test Hypothesis 1, we focused on the influence of
CEO traditionality by distinguishing between family
firms that selected family members as successors and
those that did not. In our sample, 112 of the 196 family
CEOs preferred to choose family members rather than
nonfamily members as their successors. To model the
differences between the choice of family successors
and the choice of non-family successors, we used the
method suggested by Hair et al. (1995). We conducted
a binominal (maximum likelihood) logistic regression
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to test our hypotheses, using a dichotomous outcome
variable to generate odds ratios for the dependent variables rather than the coefficients alone. The odds ratio
we used is as follows:

(

)

P(Y ) = 1 / 1 + e − z ,
where Y is the outcome variable equal to the probability
that a family firm selects a family member as the potential CEO successor, and Z is a linear combination of the
independent variables, that is,
Z = b0 + b1 X 1 + b2 X 2 +  + bn X n .
The binary logistic regression shed light on the factors
significantly related to the likelihood of a given family
firm choosing an inside successor. To minimize multicollinearity, the CEO’s traditionality, the family’s identification with the firm, and the family’s sense of dynasty
were standardized prior to the regression analyses. The
presence of multicollinearity was assessed in the regression model. The values of the variance inflation factors
were all below 3.0, ruling out multicollinearity concerns
(Neter et al., 1985).

Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and
Pearson correlations of all the variables used in our analyses. The zero-order correlation between CEO traditionality and the likelihood of selecting a family member as
successor is 0.39 (p < .01). Family members’ identification with the firm is strongly correlated with their sense
of dynasty, with a value of 0.56 (p < .01).
To test our hypotheses, we introduced the main effects
and the interactions to our specific binary logistic regression models. The results of the binomial logistic regressions are described in Table 2. Model 1 was the baseline
model and included only the control variables. In the second step, we included the independent variable (CEO traditionality) in our model. Model 2 was used to test
Hypothesis 1, that is, the relationship between CEO traditionality and successor choice. In Model 3, we added two
moderators to our model (family members’ identification
with the firm and family members’ sense of dynasty).
Model 4 included all the interaction terms and tested the

moderating effects of the family members’ identification
with the firm and their sense of dynasty. All the models
were significant at the 0.01 level. The alpha values for the
binominal regression models were also significant.
Therefore, the models were a good fit for our sample.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that traditional family CEOs are
more likely to choose family members as their successors. Model 2 showed that the main effect for the likelihood of choosing a family member successor is positive
and significant, with an odds ratio of 3.73. This finding
indicates that increasing CEO traditionality by one standard deviation doubles the odds ratio (i.e., the probability
of selecting a family successor over a nonfamily successor). The change in χ2 from Model 1 to Model 2 is significant (35.96, p < .001). These results suggest that the
likelihood of selecting a family member successor
increases in a positive, nonlinear fashion as CEO traditionality increases, which supports Hypothesis 1.
Model 4 introduced the interactions between the two
moderators and CEO traditionality (Hypotheses 2 and 3).
The coefficient of the interaction between family members’ identification with the firm and CEO traditionality
is positive and significant (β = .67, p < .05), with an
odds ratio of 1.95. Thus, Model 2 provided evidence that
family members’ identification with the firm moderates
CEO traditionality in driving the selection of a family
member successor. To better understand the moderating
role of family members’ identification with the firm, we
plotted our findings in Figure 1. This figure illustrates the
interaction between CEO traditionality and family members’ identification with the firm. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2, there is a strong relationship between CEO
traditionality and the probability of selecting a family
successor when family members’ identification with the
firm is high. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that family members’ sense of
dynasty positively moderates the relationship between
CEO traditionality and successor choice. However, we
found that family members’ sense of dynasty weakens
the positive effects of CEO traditionality on successor
choice (β = −0.94, p < .01), which contradicts
Hypothesis 3. Figure 2 describes the interaction effects
between CEO traditionality and family members’ sense
of dynasty. As shown in Figure 2, the positive effects of
high CEO traditionality on successor choice is less significant as family members’ sense of dynasty increases.
Family members’ sense of dynasty was found to
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Firm size
Firm age
Industry
Firm performance
Family ownership
Family involvement
CEO gender
CEO age
CEO education
CEO’s birth order
Retire age
No. of siblings
No. of children
Religious belief
CEO traditionality
Family identification
Sense of dynasty
Inside successor

*p < .05. **p < .01.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Variables
6.84
12.1
0.46
4.77
0.76
3.69
0.95
48
2.97
2.27
60.21
3.67
1.57
0.44
4.47
4.69
4.69
0.45

M
1.76
7.84
0.5
0.81
0.32
1.65
0.34
6.65
0.84
1.28
4.78
1.60
0.69
0.49
1.78
0.96
0.98
0.50

SD
1
0.34**
0.06
−0.09
0.08
0.24
−0.03
0.37**
0.14
0.06
0.24
0.21
0.14
0.11
−0.04
0.06
−0.06
0.08

1

3

1
0.07
1
−0.06
0.03
−0.16
0.07
0.08 −0.01
−0.04
0.03
0.36** −0.01
0.10
0.04
0.05 −0.11
0.21
0.02
0.15 −0.09
0.16
0.24
0.08
0.02
−0.01
0.06
0.07
0.00
0.02 −0.01
0.00
0.02

2

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.

1
−0.08
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.13
−0.03
0.01
0.02
−0.04
−0.01
0.39**
0.32**
0.35**
0.09

4

1
−0.05
0.07
−0.01
−0.04
0.02
−0.04
0.02
−0.05
−0.16
−0.09
−0.12
−0.16
0.01

5

7

1
−0.01
1
0.16 −0.01
0.05
0.08
0.09 −0.10
0.29** 0.01
0.22 −0.07
−0.07 −0.02
0.03 −0.10
0.01
0.04
0.08 −0.04
0.20 −0.10
0.04 −0.12

6

9

1
−0.05
1
0.11 −0.04
0.43** 0.14
0.46** −0.10
0.23 −0.04
−0.03
0.16
0.15
0.02
0.11
0.06
0.11
0.12
0.17 −0.05

8

11

1
−0.02 1
0.61* 0.11
−0.03 0.00
0.15 0.16
−0.08 −0.03
−0.08 0.00
0.00 0.12
−0.02 0.13

10

1
0.14
0.05
0.09
0.01
0.10
0.16

12

1
0.01
0.14
0.03
0.01
0.03

13

1
−0.01
0.03
0.07
0.15

14

16

17

1
0.37** 1
0.35** 0.56** 1
0.39** 0.23 0.20

15
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SE

OR

N = 196.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Constant
−2.92
2.21
0.98
Firm size
−0.02
0.02
1.02
Firm age
0.02
0.10
1.29
Industry
0.26
0.90
1.23
Firm performance
0.20
0.16
1.28
Family ownership
0.25
0.51
0.98
Family involvement
−0.02
0.05
0.47
CEO gender
−0.76
0.48
1.03
CEO age
0.03
0.03
0.84
CEO education
−0.17
0.19
0.71
CEO’s birth order
−0.34
0.16
1.03
CEO’s retire age
0.03
0.04
1.36
No. of siblings
0.31
0.15*
0.96
No. of children
−0.04
0.24
2.16
CEO religious belief
0.77
0.33*
0.98
CEO’s traditionality
Family identification
Family sense of dynasty
Traditionality × family identification
Traditionality × Family sense of dynasty
Goodness of fit
−2 log likelihood
−123.84
−105.38
−101.56
Chi-square
22.95***
58.91***
65.36***
0.11
0.26
0.29
Cox and Snell R2
0.15
0.35
0.38
Nagelkerke R2
Hosmer and Lemeshow
0.21
0.27
0.75

B

Model 1

Table 2. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Inside Successor Likelihood.

−96.93
74.62***
0.32
0.43
0.88

−3.29
−0.01
0.09
0.02
−0.21
0.49
−0.02
−0.01
−1.08
−0.20
−0.27
0.06
0.32
−0.16
0.84
1.32

B
2.33
0.02
0.11
0.96
0.20
0.55
0.05
0.04
0.52
0.21
0.18
0.04
0.16*
0.27
0.37*
0.26***

SE

Model 2

0.03
0.99
1.09
1.02
0.81
1.64
0.98
0.99
0.34
0.82
0.76
1.06
1.38
0.85
2.31
3.73

OR
−3.53
−0.01
0.09
−0.04
−0.35
0.66
−0.04
−1.07
−0.02
−0.21
−0.26
0.07
0.34
−0.12
0.77
1.39
0.22
0.11

B
2.43
0.02
0.12
1.01
0.22
0.57
0.06
0.54
0.04
0.22
0.18
0.04
0.17*
0.28
0.37*
0.28***
0.23
0.23

SE

Model 3

0.03
0.99
1.09
0.96
0.70
1.94
0.97
0.34
0.98
0.81
0.77
1.07
1.41
0.89
2.15
4.02
1.25
1.12

OR

−4.16
−0.01
0.06
−0.22
−0.40
0.64
−0.04
−1.43
−0.03
−0.04
−0.36
0.09
0.43
−0.13
0.82
1.55
0.15
0.30
0.67
−0.94

B

2.64
0.03
0.12
1.05
0.22
0.59
0.06
0.60*
0.04
0.24
0.19
0.05
0.18*
0.30
0.39*
0.33***
0.24
0.26
0.33*
0.38**

SE

Model 4

0.02
0.99
1.06
0.80
0.67
1.90
0.96
0.24
0.97
0.96
0.7
1.09
1.53
0.88
2.27
4.72
1.16
1.35
1.95
0.39

OR
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Figure 1. Interaction effects between family members’ identification with the firm and CEOs’ traditionality on successor
choice.

substitute for the influence of CEO traditionality on successor choice. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.

Discussion
From a psychological perspective, this study is one of
the first attempts to introduce and test the idea that a
family firm’s successor choice is affected by its CEO’s
traditionality. Integrating upper echelons theory and the
concept of SEW, we developed and tested a CEO psychological trait–organizational behavior research framework under various family affective contexts. Our
regression results suggest that CEO traditionality significantly increases the likelihood that a family member
is chosen as successor. Using the concept of SEW, we
tested the moderating effects of family members’ identification with the firm and sense of dynasty on the relationship between CEO traditionality and successor
choice. Our results suggest that family members’ identification with the firm increases their likelihood of valuing group members and following the firm leader’s
decisions, which in turn strengthens the positive effects
of CEO traditionality on the likelihood that an inside
successor is chosen.
However, the family’s sense of dynasty can substitute
for the influence of CEO traditionality on successor
choice. This finding is inconsistent with our speculation.

A possible reason for this finding is that families with a
strong sense of dynasty usually are focused and oriented
toward the future, and thus they tend to devise succession plans in advance, which can substitute for the traditional CEO’s decision in selecting an inside successor.
Prior evidence has suggested that the family’s sense of
dynasty has significant implications in terms of the time
horizons of the firm’s decision making, such as successor selection (Zellweger et al., 2011). Dynastic succession represents the ultimate nonfinancial goal of the
entire family and is therefore considered an important
reference point in successor selection (Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). When the ultimate goal of intrafamily succession is established within
the family network, the incumbent CEO’s personal role
and behaviors can be viewed as reflections of the family’s goals. In line with the literature on substitution leadership (Lajoie et al., 2017), value congruence between
followers and leaders substitutes for the effectiveness of
leadership when followers are powerful. We suggest that
the family’s sense of dynasty represents a strong collective power toward the family’s ultimate goal, which can
substitute the CEO’s functions (Dammann, 1984; Den
Hartog & Koopman, 2001).
It is important to note the different moderating
effects of the two dimensions of SEW because they do
not contribute equally to the accumulation of SEW.
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Figure 2. Interaction effects between family members’ sense of dynasty and CEOs’ traditionality on successor choice.

Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) introduced the concept of
SEW as a stock of family-centric affective resources and
noneconomic benefits (Chua et al., 2015). As such, it is
likely that different family characteristics lead to varied
levels of accumulation in SEW stock. For instance,
Zellweger et al. (2011) suggested that the family’s strong
sense of dynasty is a key aspect of SEW because it contributes greatly to SEW accumulation through frequent
communications and shared goals within the family. The
strong repeated reinforcement of family bonds over time
has extremely salient effects (Zellweger et al., 2011).
Evidence has also shown that transgenerational sustainability is commonly seen as the ultimate goal of family
firms (Kets de Vries, 1993; Zellweger et al., 2011). In
comparison, a family’s identification with the firm
makes a smaller contribution to SEW because it reflects
the values held by individual family members, not by
the collective. Greater SEW (e.g., a sense of dynasty)
can substitute for the effectiveness of a family firm’s
leadership when there is value congruence between the
leader and the family employees. Therefore, we suggest
that different dimensions of SEW exert different degrees
of power in constraining or amplifying the effects of
CEOs’ values on family firms’ strategies.
Our study makes several theoretical contributions to
the family business literature and upper echelons theory. First, we propose a new antecedent of family
firms’ successor choice: traditionality, a psychological
trait of incumbent CEOs. We argue that traditionality
shapes CEOs’ degree of familism and endorsement of

hierarchical relationships in society, both of which
significantly influence successor choice. This theoretical development is important because most past research
has only offered explanations of CEO successor choice
from the perspectives of business or family (e.g., Ansari
et al., 2014; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Zajac, 1990).
None of these studies have captured the significant
effect of incumbent CEOs’ individual-level psychological traits on firms’ succession decision making.
By incorporating the psychological concept of traditionality (Farh et al., 2007), this study responds to recent
calls for research to consider psychological constructs
and theories to advance family business studies (De
Massis & Foss, 2018; Holt et al., 2018; Zahra & Newey,
2009). We suggest that by examining traditionality, we
can gain a deeper understanding of how cultural values
affect a CEO’s psychological biases regarding insiders
and outsiders in successor selection. Despite the recent
scholarly interest in the implications of cultural values
for family business succession (Anggadwita et al.,
2019), microlevel analyses of cultural effects have thus
far not been conducted in family business research to
advance more sophisticated theories (De Massis & Foss,
2018). In contrast to society-level cultural dimensions
(e.g., power distance and masculinity) in Hofstede’s
(2001) model, traditionality describes individual differences in cultural value toward Confucian social ethics.
As such, traditionality is a construct we can use to
explore the individual determinants of the incumbent’s
intention toward intrafamily succession (De Massis
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et al., 2016). Additionally, as traditionality originates
in Confucianism and family governance, it captures the
unique characteristics of individuals who are influenced by Confucian ideology. These characteristics
have been largely ignored in other constructs (e.g.,
power distance and masculinity), but are much more
relevant to the family business phenomena in East
Asia. Given the significant influence of incumbent
CEOs’ psychological traits and biases on firms’ strategic decision making (De Massis & Foss, 2018; Judge
et al., 2009), our study emphasizes the importance of
incorporating the concept of CEO traditionality into
our understanding of the motivations behind intrafamily succession in the Confucian context.
Our study also responds to recent calls to dive
deeper into the theoretical mechanisms underlying
SEW. In particular, we highlight the importance of
investigating the effects of different dimensions of
SEW separately (De Massis & Foss, 2018; Jiang et al.,
2018). Family firms vary in the degree of their social
concerns, which, in this study, are family members’
desire to achieve intrafamily succession and their identification with the firm (Holt et al., 2018; Jiang et al.,
2018). Whereas most studies in this field have viewed
SEW as an all-encompassing black box of noneconomic goals (e.g., Vandekerkhof et al., 2015), we posit
that different dimensions of family firms’ SEW, notably family members’ identification with the firm and
their sense of dynasty, create different family contexts
for CEO decision making. The heterogeneous SEW
perspective and the family firm context are promising
ways to better contextualize management theories such
as the upper echelon perspective (Gedajlovic et al.,
2012). We argue that different dimensions of SEW represent differences in the family’s power to shape the
CEO’s decisions. For instance, family members’ individual strong identification with the firm creates a positive, supportive environment for the CEO’s decision
making. The collective decision-making process may
occur in a family business when family members have
a common sense of dynasty and regard it as the ultimate goal of the entire family. Such an environment
may weaken the functions of the CEO’s individual psychological traits in initiating strategies. Our results
shed light on group emotions (Menges & Kilduff,
2015) and thus enhance the understanding of how family members’ affective, cognitive, motivational, and
social considerations affect CEOs’ decisions.
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Furthermore, our study contributes to the literature
on upper echelons theory in two ways. First, we examine the construct of traditionality at the CEO level. As
most studies on leadership have only examined the
effects of traditionality at the employee or middle manager level (e.g., Farh et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2014), the
top management piece of the puzzle is missing. We
emphasize the significant role of CEOs’ individual-level
cultural values (e.g., traditionality) in shaping family
firms’ decisions and behaviors. Understanding the cultural values of executives is important in strategy
(Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Giberson et al., 2009), as
these values reflect their internalized beliefs about what
they pursue in managerial practice (Ravlin et al., 2000).
In demonstrating the significant influence of CEO traditionality on successor choice in family firms, we extend
the literature on upper echelons theory by noting that
traditionality, as formed by national and family cultures,
is an important but overlooked psychological characteristic of CEOs. Second, our study explores the different
environmental conditions under which a CEO’s cultural
values are amplified and become ingrained in the family
business context (Koch, 2011). Previous research on
upper echelons theory has focused on the boundary conditions of CEOs’ characteristics from the business perspective (e.g., managerial discretion; Li & Tang, 2010)
and on macroenvironmental factors (e.g., Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1993; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014). Our study
suggests that in the family business context, CEOs’
influence is largely constrained by family systems
(James et al., 2012). By testing the moderating roles of
two dimensions of SEW, our research enriches the literature on upper echelons theory and reveals the importance of family affective variables in constraining or
amplifying the effects of CEO characteristics in the family business setting.

Managerial Implications
Our findings have practical implications for family business management, as they show that CEOs’ traditional
values are a key barrier to the likelihood that family
firms choose outside professional managers as successors. Highly traditional CEOs may face a dilemma in
successor choice when there are no qualified successors
among their family members. Nonfamily managers may
also perceive themselves to be inequitably treated if
expectations and demands of them are higher than those
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of family members (Tabor et al., 2018). Accordingly, it
is important for family firm CEOs to (1) recognize that
their traditionality has a considerable influence on their
perceptions of who the right successor candidates are,
(2) strive for open-mindedness, and (3) prioritize the
family business’s prosperity and survivability. For family CEOs with high levels of traditionality, visiting
Western companies and interacting with their representatives may be advisable, as learning about different
management cultures may trigger reflection and shed
light on the individual-level limitations of human
resource management in the family business context.
Second, our results show that the influence of a
CEO’s traditionality on a family firm’s successor choice
can be strengthened by family members’ identification
with the firm. Family members who identify more
strongly with the family business are more likely to support the CEO’s decisions. For family CEOs with low
levels of traditionality who intend to make a strategic
change by employing outside professional managers to
improve performance, sufficient communication with
the family is encouraged to increase family members’
identification with the business’s goals rather than the
family’s goals.
Moreover, our results suggest that in family firms,
the family’s sense of dynasty may overpower the CEO’s
personal influence on successor choice. For firms with
low or average performance, choosing an outside professional manager as successor can enhance the firm’s
human capital and strategic innovation (Bennedsen
et al., 2007; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). However, a
family’s strong sense of dynasty constrains the effects of
an incumbent CEO’s preference for outside (vs. inside)
professional managers, which in turn may cost the firm
the opportunity to improve its performance. A family’s
strong sense of dynasty may discourage and ultimately
prevent the incumbent CEO from appointing a professional manager as successor, even if the inside candidates are not equipped to ensure the firm’s prosperity
and survivability. Families with a strong sense of dynasty
should realize that the survival and growth of the business sometimes takes precedence over the emotional
desire to perpetuate the family dynasty. There cannot be
a continuous family dynasty if there is no “empire” to
continue. In other words, it is crucial for family members to be aware of the objective well-being of the firm
and to consider whether perpetuating family succession
is more important than keeping the family firm successful in the long run. Overemphasizing family-centered
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goals is dangerous because it encourages decision makers
to insist on family control despite potential threats to
firm performance (Schulze & Kellermanns, 2015).

Limitations and Future Research
This study has several limitations that might be potentially fruitful avenues for future research. First, although
we sampled 196 organizations in major cities in mainland China, our results should be tested in other cultural
contexts to ensure their generalizability (Pellegrini &
Scandura, 2008). Traditionality is a key component of
the Confucian value system. Therefore, the effects of a
CEO’s traditionality on a family firm’s strategies should
be investigated in other countries that are influenced by
Confucianism, such as Korea and Japan (Wang et al.,
2005). Expanding this investigation to other countries
and organizational settings will improve our understanding of this topic.
Second, our cross-sectional research design did not
allow us to draw definitive conclusions about causation
or to capture the influence of dynamic changes in family emotional support. For example, family members’
identification with the firm and their sense of dynasty
change over time or with internal and external conditions. Future research should analyze longitudinal and/
or experimental data on CEO traditionality, family
members’ identification with the firm and their sense of
dynasty, and successor choice, to further validate the
causal relationships observed in this study. Although
we controlled for the effect of the incumbent CEO’s
number of children to rule out the influence of the family’s internal talent pool on successor choice, we were
unable to directly examine the effects of the willingness
and capability of internal potential successors. The
more children an incumbent CEO has, the more likely
the CEO has a positive attitude toward intrafamily succession (De Massis et al., 2016). Future studies should
collect second-generation data on family businesses to
capture the influence of firms’ internal talent pools on
successor choice.
In addition, our data did not allow us to explore the
influence of boards of directors on the CEOs’ succession
decisions. The family firms identified in this study were
all privately held firms that had maintained family ownership (with a mean of 76%) and that had at least two
family members (3.69 on average) in top management
positions. Although we controlled for these key family
firm characteristics, we did not obtain information on
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whether a given firm had a functional board, how many
family members sat on the board, and whether the CEO
occupied the position of board chair. As all of the firms
in our sample were privately held and maintained tight
family control over both ownership and management,
they were relatively unlikely to have active boards, and
if they had active boards, they would have served primarily as rubber stamps. Nonetheless, research has suggested that the presence of family members on the board
of directors offers a way for the controlling family to
manage its influence on the firm’s governance and strategic transitions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Thus, when
exploring family firm succession decisions, future studies should consider board-level factors, such as the ratio
of family members on the board, CEO duality, director
network/social capital, board member characteristics,
and the degree of board independence.
Although our results suggest that a family’s sense of
dynasty can substitute for the main effects of CEO traditionality on successor choice, as family members and
the CEO share values and goals, we do not know how
different family affective factors constrain the functions
of the CEO’s characteristics when the family’s values
conflict with the CEO’s values. For example, how family traditions affect the influence of a CEO’s cultural
openness on decision making is a question worth exploring in future research. Given the potential conflict
between tradition and strategic change (e.g., Erdogan
et al., 2019), future studies should investigate the effects
of other CEO cultural values (e.g., openness; Hall et al.,
2001) on successor choice in different family affective
contexts to provide insight into how family contexts
constrain or amplify the influence of CEO values.
Finally, the scope of our study was limited to one outcome variable—successor choice. As traditionalists tend
to orient themselves toward authoritarianism (Yang,
2003), CEOs’ traditionality may influence various strategic decisions associated with their sense of control.
Our results confirm prior findings that family business
traditions over generations are shaped by the founders’
strong values and beliefs (Kammerlander et al., 2015)
and pose a substantial obstacle to family firms’ strategic
change (Lumpkin et al., 2008). Similar to tradition
(Erdogan et al., 2019; Linnekin, 1983), traditionality
hinders organizational change, such as the hiring of an
outside professional manager, as it is associated with the
deep commitment, social norms, and hierarchical relationships of family firms. We suggest that future research
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focus on the effects of CEO traditionality on strategic
changes beyond successor choice, such as market expansion, new product innovation, and internationalization.
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